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Model-Based Evaluation of 
the Impact of Attacks to the 
Telecommunication Service 
of the Electrical Grid
ABSTRACT
This chapter is devoted to the study of the consequences of cyber-attacks to the telecommunication ser-
vice of the electrical grid, which is an essential service for the grid control system. It is up to the control 
system to ensure that even very large power systems are kept in equilibrium even in presence of power 
contingencies. This chapter considers cyber-attacks of the Denial of Service (DoS) type, occurring while 
the electrical grid is already facing an electrical failure that requires a load shedding strategy. Using 
a model-based approach that uses the rich and flexible formalism provided by the tool Möbius, it is 
possible to investigate the interplay between an attack to the telecommunication service and the state 
of the grid in a number of different situations and for different characterizations of the DoS behaviour 
and severity. The formalism used allows to associate a (stochastic) duration and/or a probability to the 
events happening in the system, so as to take into account the variability in attacks’ behaviour, leading 
to a quantitative characterization of the impact of a DoS attack to the electrical grid.
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-2964-6.ch011
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INTRODUCTION
Energy Power Systems (EPS) can be considered 
as the composition of two major elements: the 
Energy Infrastructure (denominated in the follow-
ing Energy Infrastructure EI) and the information 
and communication technology distributed control 
system (denominated in the following Informa-
tion Infrastructure II) that supervises the EI. 
The supervision and control may be impaired by 
malfunctions in the underlying telecommunica-
tion system, or in some node of the control system 
itself. Even assuming that the II is working, we 
have to consider the possibility that cyber attacks 
may alter its correct behaviour: this may be due to 
a specific malware that alters the behaviour of the 
EI control algorithm, or the value of the control 
data transmitted, but it may be also due to an at-
tack to the telecommunication network, provoking 
message losses and/or delays which may lead to 
a partial malfunctioning of the control system. 
Lost or delayed messages may not be so crucial 
when the EI is working in normal status, but they 
may have drastic consequences when the EI is 
facing an electrical failure. Since EPSs provide 
vital services to a variety of activities governing 
people life, it is of relevant importance to assess 
the possible cascading effects that failures in the 
II control subsystems may have, when they occur 
in critical scenarios of the EI.
Indeed an important step towards the design of 
a reliable service, consists in clarifying the (inter)
dependencies between the electrical and informa-
tion infrastructures. In particular it is important to 
investigate the possible consequences of a failure 
to one or more nodes of the II distributed control 
system, or to the telecommunication network 
supporting the information exchange among the 
distributed control system components at different 
levels in the EI control hierarchy. The large space 
of possible critical situations need to be explored 
selecting a set of representative scenarios (that 
should be enriched on the basis of the experience) 
and evaluating the possible behaviours as a func-
tion of the type of failure (e.g. those caused by an 
attack) and of the state of the EI when the failure 
comes into play. It is very important to have a ref-
erence framework to abstract out from the details 
of the specific scenario or experiment, recognize 
recurring patterns of cascading behaviour, and 
provide a quantitative evaluation of their impact.
Although the modelling of the types of failures 
that are characteristic of interdependent critical 
infrastructures has received increasing interest in 
the last years, after the large blackouts of electric 
power systems in 1996 and 2003, there is still no 
definite understanding on EPS interdependen-
cies, and on the techniques to evaluate even the 
dependency between an II failure/malfunctioning 
and the services provided by the whole EPS. It 
is indeed of great importance for the utilities op-
erating the infrastructures to have methods/tools 
for analysing threat impacts and technologies for 
avoiding, or limiting, most serious consequences.
Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy Grid ICT 
Infrastructures” of this book has characterized 
and analysed the risk of different types of cyber 
attacks to the II, which is a fundamental step in 
setting up ICT countermeasures, but a complete 
evaluation of the attack impact requires an evalu-
ation of the consequences of a successful attack 
on the overall behaviour of the electrical grid. In 
this chapter we propose a framework to understand 
and evaluate the cascading effects of attacks to 
the telecommunication service that supports the 
distributed control system of an energy grid in 
critical scenarios (like in presence of a failure of 
a grid component). A model-based approach is 
chosen, due to its high flexibility in exploring a 
wide range of alternatives at a limited cost and 
in representing at different abstraction levels the 
various layers of the EPS hierarchy (e.g. transmis-
sion versus distribution, local versus regional and 
multiregional as proposed for example in (Bec-
cuti, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, Donatelli, 
Dondossola & Franceschinis, 2012), (Chiara-
donna, Lollini & Di Giandomenico, 2007) and 
(Chiaradonna, Giandomenico & Nostro, 2011). 
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In particular a stochastic modelling approach has 
been pursued, that allows to represent randomness 
of physical faults and to model at a sufficiently 
high level of abstraction the effect of malicious 
attacks, as they propagate under variable network 
conditions. Moreover, model based approaches 
have the potential to support extensive experimen-
tation on a wide variety of scenarios, analysing 
the infrastructures behaviour and their mutual 
interdependencies at different abstraction levels, 
depending on the aim of the study. A combina-
tion of analytical and simulation approaches may 
be applied to evaluate the indices of interest, 
measuring the severity of the consequences of a 
simultaneous occurrence of physical failures in 
the EI and a malfunction in the II control system 
(possibly caused by a cyber attack).
In this chapter we build on the model of EPS 
presented in (Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico & 
Lollini, 2011), which defines a set of stochastic 
models representing in a rather faithful way (yet 
abstract enough to be tractable) both the electrical 
infrastructure evolution in presence of failures, 
and the control actions activated by the control 
system (both locally and at a higher level in the 
control hierarchy). The model is here enriched 
with a set of submodels that represent a cyber 
attack. We concentrate on DoS attacks, and con-
sequently the model of the EPS includes also a 
rather detailed model of the DoS behaviour, both 
the DoS internal evolution (the DoS attack may 
increase or decrease in severity) and the effect on 
the messages exchanged by the control system 
(delayed or lost messages).
The model obtained can then be exercised 
with different parameters for the EI and the II 
behaviour, to investigate the impact of the DoS 
behaviour on the service delivered by the EPS. 
Due to the complexity of the model, the results 
have been collected using large sets of simulation 
runs. In particular in this chapter we report the 
experiments for a scenario in which the EPS has 
to execute a load shedding strategy due to an EI 
failure, as already described in Chapter “Cyber 
Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures”, and 
the electrical grid of reference is the IEEE RTS96 
test grid.
Although this chapter concentrate on DoS 
attacks, the set-up of the interaction between the 
models of the attack and of the EPS is adequate for 
any type of attack that delays or deletes packets.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. 
First, background is provided by overviewing 
relevant literature on the study of dependencies, 
in particular in the case of electrical infrastruc-
ture. The proposed modelling framework is then 
described, with a two level approach: the logical 
scheme is described first, which identifies the 
components of the EPS and their interaction at 
a rather high level of abstraction, followed by a 
more detailed description of the specific models 
of the components and of their interactions. The 
modelling framework is finally exercised on the 
case study. A particular attention has been devoted 
to the choice of the parameters of the model, taking 
into account the indication of the experiments on 
DoS attacks reported in Chapter “Cyber Risks in 
Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures” of this book, 
both to parameterize the model and to define the 
performance indices of interest.
BACKGROUND
Understanding the interdependencies among 
interacting critical infrastructures, as well as 
quantifying resiliency, security and robustness 
related indicators are tackled by a number of 
research initiatives (see (Chiaradonna, Di Gi-
andomenico & Lollini, 2008) for an overview). 
A rigorous approach to analyse and understand 
how infrastructure sectors evolve, where they 
are vulnerable, and how they can be protected is 
presented in (Lewis, 2006).
The infrastructures interdependency issues 
have been tackled in several projects in Europe 
and the United States. The IRRIIS European 
project (IRRIIS) has devoted significant effort 
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to interdependencies analysis and modelling. 
A theoretical framework has been developed in 
(Nieuwenhuijs, Luiijf & Klaver, 2009), which 
views a Critical Infrastructure (CI) as a process and 
dependencies as response functions. Quantitative 
interdependency analysis, in the context of Large 
Complex CI, is presented in (Bloomfield, Buzna, 
Popov, Salako & Wright, 2009), where a discrete 
state-space, continuous-time stochastic process 
models the operation of critical infrastructure, 
taking interdependencies into account. Of primary 
interest are the implications of both the abstrac-
tion level of the model and its parameterization 
on the distribution of cascade sizes within and 
across infrastructures. The IRRIIS consortium 
has developed SimCIP (Simulation for CI Pro-
tection), an agent-based simulation environment 
for controlled experimentation, with the aim of 
providing insights on CI behaviour and their 
interdependencies (Klein, 2008). The proposed 
scenario considers the impact of EI failures on 
the ICT control system.
The CRUTIAL European Project (CRUTIAL) 
has dedicated significant efforts to the modelling 
of (inter)dependencies between the two infra-
structures constituting an EPS (Electrical Power 
System): the power grid and its cyber controls. In 
the context of CRUTIAL, an innovative, modular 
EPS modelling approach, that considers separately 
the two constituting infrastructures but takes into 
account their interdependencies and allows to 
assess the impact of reciprocal failures, has been 
developed (Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico & 
Lollini, 2011).
The National Science Foundation project 
TCIP, currently extended in TCIP-G (TCIP-G) 
with support from the Department of Energy and 
contributions from the Department of Homeland 
Security, focuses on securing the low-level devices, 
communication and data systems that make up 
the power grid, to ensure trustworthy operation 
during normal conditions, cyber attacks and/or 
power emergencies. As reported in (Sanders, 
2010), quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
constitutes a major research effort in TCIP with 
investigations on means to model, simulate, emu-
late and experiment with the various subsystems 
in the power grid. Although interdependencies are 
among the aspects of interest in these studies, the 
major effort is devoted to cyber security, smart grid 
vulnerabilities and communication technologies.
A review of the work related to Smart Grid 
cyber security is presented in (Baumeister, 2010), 
which also includes security assessment methods 
spanning attack injection, simulation and proba-
bilistic approaches.
Attack trees (Ten, Liu & Govindarasu, 2007), 
attack graphs (Lippman & Ingols, 2005 and Chap-
ter “Using Hybrid Attack Graphs to Model and 
Analyze Attacks against the Critical Information 
Infrastructure” of this book) and access graphs 
(Hahn & Govindarasu, 2010) have been proposed 
for cyber security analysis in smart grids; such 
methods are directed to find ways in which an 
adversary can exploit vulnerabilities to break 
into a system and to assess the exposure level of 
the system to such attacks. An exposure metric to 
identify the set of security mechanisms required 
to protect the various information objects utilized 
within a grid has been proposed in (Hahn & Gov-
indarasu, 2011). Other works have been directed 
to the analysis of structural vulnerabilities and the 
risk of cyber attacks. In (Bompard, Napoli & Xue, 
2009), the authors conducted a structural analy-
sis of the power transmission grid by applying a 
topological approach that extends the traditional 
topological metrics derived from complex network 
theory. This approach can be used to assess struc-
tural vulnerabilities in power systems in contrast 
with traditional, purely topological metrics. The 
impact analysis of control systems availability on 
managing power contingencies is not supported 
by this extended topological approach.
Also, a number of experimental testbeds have 
been set-up for security analysis of a variety of 
aspects related with smart grids, such as the work 
in (Coppolino, D’Antonio, Elia & Romano, 2011) 
concerning technologies for data collection, and 
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most of the literature reported in Chapter “Cyber 
Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures” of 
this book.
Differently from these approaches, we are not 
interested in identifiying the vulnerability paths 
and the success probability of the attack; rather, 
our objective is to analyze the consequences of 
the attacks on the ability of the system to preserve 
the correct operation.
Security and privacy challenges faced by the 
smarter electrical grids that are going to replace 
physical infrastructures in the near future are 
overviewed in (McDaniel & McLaughlin, 2009). 
Several attacks typologies are identified, and a 
national effort is advocated to investigate smart 
grid security, including the extensive evaluation 
of the security of these devices, both in the labora-
tory and in the field.
In (Beccuti, Franceschinis, Donatelli, Chiara-
donna, Di Giandomenico, Lollini et al., 2009) 
and (Beccuti, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, 
Donatelli, Dondossola & Franceschinis, 2012) 
the effect of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
during the execution of an emergency procedure 
recovering from a power grid failure scenario has 
been evaluated using stochastic models: the ap-
proach is similar to (Bloomfield, Buzna, Popov, 
Salako & Wright, 2009), but it is specifically 
tailored to EPS and allows to deal with a more 
detailed representation of the major components 
and dynamics of the power grid and related ICT 
controls. Considering the effect of attacks to the 
ICT on failure propagation in the EPS, the sce-
nario is complementary with respect to the IRRIIS 
ones. The work in this chapter extends the stud-
ies in (Beccuti, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, 
Franceschinis, Donatelli & Dondossola, 2012) in 
two directions: i) by proposing novel models for 
the attacks affecting the control infrastructure, 
and ii) by embedding in the developed models 
more faithful parameters characterizing the at-
tacks behaviour, as determined by experimental 
studies documented in Chapter “Cyber Risks in 
Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures” of this book.
THE MODELING FRAMEWORK
The modelling framework is here described with 
a two-level approach: the logical structure of the 
model is presented first, and then the specific 
models are discussed in more detail.
The logical structure depicts how the physical 
electrical grid is modelled, and how the control 
system is taken into account, as well as the char-
acteristics of the DoS attack have been considered, 
and how the model of the attack influences the 
model of the control.
The overall model has been developed with a 
compositional approach, well supported by the 
Möbius tool (Daly, Deavours, Doyle, Webster & 
Sanders, 2000) used for the modelling activity.
Thanks to the features offered by Möbius, a 
modular approach to models development has been 
possible, with the definition of atomic models 
capturing the structure and behaviour of basic EPS 
components and related phenomena, then properly 
composed to obtain the overall EPS model.
The model will be the exercised on a reference 
scenario, and it has been tailored with an abstrac-
tion level adequate to represent all the relevant 
aspects of the scenario. We shall therefore describe 
it first, to then explain the modelling framework, 
articulated in a description at the logical level, 
followed by a more detailed explanation of each 
model component.
Reference Scenario
We consider an EPS system in which, in emergency 
conditions, the Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) is authorized by the Distribution System 
Operators (DSO) to activate load shedding activi-
ties on the Distribution Grid to actuate defence/
recover actions. This is exactly the same scenario 
considered in Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy 
Grid ICT Infrastructures” of this book, depicted 
in Figure 5 (of the same chapter), that we sum-
marize here for ease of reference. The structure 
of the EPS system (ICT control and power grid 
elements controlled by) is also described in the 
same chapter, with the support of Figure 3.
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The TSO Control Centre monitors continu-
ously the EPS and when it detects a potentially 
dangerous condition that can be recovered with 
appropriate load shedding strategies (applied to 
specific areas of the grid), it chooses a subset of 
DSO SubStations (SSs) from the list of DSO SSs 
participating in the emergency plan, and sends 
the requests of preventively arming these DSO 
SSs. The request is sent to their DSO Control 
Centers (CCs), through a shared communication 
channel. Then the DSO CC forwards the arm 
request to the required DSO SSs, and returns the 
status of the substations to the TSO CC.
At the same time, a special TSO substation 
called TSO sentinel (usually a TSO node located 
in a strategic point of the grid) independently 
monitors the EI status to quickly detect if the 
potential emergency condition is evolving into a 
real emergency situation. When real emergency 
situation is detected the TSO sentinel sends the 
trip command to all the DSO SSs participating to 
the emergency plan; however only the DSO SSs 
that have been previously armed will be actually 
detached. In the period between the detection of 
a potential emergency and its evolution towards 
a new status, the TSO sentinel periodically sends 
test packets towards the detachable DSO SSs. If 
an armed DSO SS does not receive three consecu-
tive test packets, it automatically disarms itself. 
Disarming also occurs after 20 min from the 
arming command if no trip command is issued 
by the sentinel.
Logical Structure of the EPS 
Components and Characterization 
of the DoS Attack
The EPS components considered are those more 
deeply involved in the interaction between II and 
EI, specifically in presence of a DoS occurring 
while the EPS is experiencing one or more elec-
trical failures. The scenario of EPS operations 
involves both Transmission and Distribution Sys-
tem Operators (TSO and DSO), but it considers as 
target of the DoS attack only the communication 
channel between a DSO control centre (DSO CC) 
and its controlled DSO substation (DSO SSs). 
Here we describe the logical EPS components 
and attack behaviours considered in the models, 
as well as their interaction schema.
Logical Scheme of EI
EI represents the electric infrastructure necessary 
to produce and transport the electric power towards 
the final users. As already considered in previous 
studies the main elements that constitute the power 
grid are: generators, substations, loads and power 
lines (which also logically include breakers and 
protections connected to the power lines). One or 
more generators can be located inside the power 
plants. The energy produced by the generators 
is then adapted by transformers, to be conveyed 
with minimal dispersion, to the different types of 
end users (loads), through different voltage level 
power grids. The power lines are components that 
physically connect the substations with the power 
plants and the final users, and the substations are 
structured components in which the electric power 
is transformed and split over several lines. In the 
substations there are transformers and several 
kinds of connection components (bus-bars, pro-
tections and breakers).
Logical Scheme of II
The Information Infrastructure implements the 
control system and its main purposes are: (1) to 
reduce the out-of-service time of generators, power 
lines and substations (availability); (2) to enhance 
quality of service (through frequency and voltage 
regulation); (3) to optimize generators and sub-
stations management. To these aims, II performs 
the following activities: (a) remote control of the 
electric infrastructure (it receives data and sends 
commands); (b) coordination of the maintenance 
(it plans the reconfiguration actions that can af-
fect generators, substations, loads and lines); (c) 
collection of the system statistics.
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Among the several logical components com-
posing II, we focus the attention on the TSO and 
DSO components, since a failure of these logical 
components can affect a large portion of the grid, 
eventually leading to service interruptions of wide 
geographical areas and large black-out phenomena.
In details, the operations performed by the 
II control system are modelled considering two 
levels of abstraction on the basis of the locality 
of the EI state considered by the II to decide on 
proper reactions to disruptions.
Each level is characterized by an activation 
condition (that specifies the events which enable 
the II reaction), a reaction delay (representing the 
overall computation and application time needed 
by II to apply a reconfiguration) and a reconfigura-
tion strategy (RS), based on generation re-dispatch 
and/or load shedding.
For each level, a different reconfiguration 
function is considered, to represent the effect on 
the electrical grid of the reactions of II to an event 
that has compromised the electrical equilibrium 
of EI, when only the state local to the affected EI 
components is considered. They are called RS1() 
and RS2().
RS1 is performed by the control units associ-
ated with the EI components (e.g. TSO Sentinels, 
DSO SubStations) and, because of the limited 
information necessary to compute its output, it 
is fast in providing its reaction. In the current 
implementation, the output of RS1 is obtained as 
the solution of a system of power flow equations 
that minimize a simple cost function, indicating 
the cost incurred in having loads not satisfied 
and having the generators producing more power. 
Observe that the reconfiguration strategy RS1 is 
applied immediately.
RS2 is performed by TSO CC through the 
DSO CC which sends the arming command to 
the selected DSO SS, and represents the effect on 
the regional transmission grid of the reactions of 
II to an event that has compromised the electrical 
equilibrium of EI, when the state of the whole EI 
system under the control of II is considered.
Therefore RS2 is determined on the global EI 
state and reacts in a longer time. In the reference 
scenario, it models the DSO SS arming as two 
asynchronous processes. The arming operation 
is immediately activated when an EI fault hap-
pens, but it requires more time than RS1 to be 
accomplished. Initially, the set of DSO SSs to be 
involved in the load shedding strategy is derived 
by solving an optimization problem to minimize 
the change in generation or load shedding, un-
der additional system constraints, as described 
in (Romani, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico & 
Simoncini, 2007).
Then the transmission of arming request to 
the selected substations is explicitly modelled 
considering the behaviours of TSO CC, DSO 
CC, and DSO SS.
DoS Attack Characterization
We do not model the DoS attack per se (gen-
eration of an high number of messages sent to a 
given target, as done for example in the testbed 
exposed in Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy Grid 
ICT Infrastructures” of this book), but the effect 
of the attack on the communication systems in 
terms of lost or delayed messages. This is an 
adequate abstraction level for our study since our 
objective is not to study the DoS behaviour, but 
the consequences of a DoS attack (and therefore 
of a malfunctioning communication network to 
the services provided by a power grid). We shall 
therefore assume that a DoS alters the behaviour 
of the communication channel by inducing lost 
and delayed messages, and that the amount of lost 
or delayed messages, and the actual delay, does 
depend on a notion of “severity level” of the DoS: 
the more severe level, the more packets are lost 
and delayed, and longer delays are experienced. 
The DoS is a dynamic process: its severity may 
increase or decrease over time.
The effect of DoS occurrence is studied under 
emergency conditions (e.g. line failure, loss of 
generation, switching errors, etc.), when recovery 
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actions have to be performed under strict real 
time constraints to avoid the fault propagation 
within the EI.
In this context, different behaviours can be 
envisaged depending on when the DoS occurs. 
For instance, a DoS attack starting before an arm-
ing request has been issued towards a given DSO 
SS may impair the possibility of the DSO SS to 
execute the trip command (only armed substation 
may detach themselves from the grid). Instead, if 
a DoS attack takes place when the substation is 
armed, the attack may deny the successful execu-
tion of the periodic testing with the consequent 
automatic disarming of the DSO SSs. Finally, the 
DoS may occur just before sending the trip com-
mand, which implies that the arming command 
have been already sent (and received, since there 
was no active DoS at the time of arming): since we 
assume that the trip command is sent on a separate 
channel, not affected by the considered DoS, then 
we can assume that it reaches the selected substa-
tions, that correctly perform the trip command. 
The global effects of the considered DoS on the 
whole EPS clearly depend on the number and 
position of the DSO SSs affected by the attack and 
on the pattern and intensity of the DoS process. 
Since in our experiments we assume a DoS attack 
on the communication channel connecting DSO 
CC to its DSO SSs, the time needed to arm DSO 
SSs can increase substantially depending on the 
DoS severity.
Indeed arming commands, sent by DSO CC 
to DSO SS, can be lost or delayed due to the DoS 
attack effect. Instead, the trip command is sent 
to all the DSO SSs asynchronously with respect 
to arming requests, but only the armed DSO SSs 
will be involved in EI reconfiguration. In this way 
a load shedding strategy is terminated correctly 
(EI stability is restored) only if all the DSO SSs 
selected to be armed have received an arming 
request; otherwise a further arming and trip com-
mands are performed.
EI and II Interaction
To better understand the interplay of EI and II 
in presence of a DoS attack we shall consider 
the sequence of events involved in two possible 
interactions between the model of the EI and that 
of the II. The first interaction happens when the 
RS1 function finishes and its result (in terms of 
local reconfiguration actions) is applied directly to 
the EI; the second happens when the RS2 function 
finishes and the load shedding strategy is applied 
to stabilize the EI.
Note that in our scenario, RS1 is not influenced 
by the modelled DoS attack since it is a local recon-
figuration; while the success of RS2, representing 
a global reconfiguration, depends on the number 
of stations that are reachable, and therefore may 
heavily depend on the DoS severity level.
The timed evolution of the EI and II models 
is shown in Figure 1, in a situation in which a EI 
failure occurs at time 0 while the communica-
tion channel between DSO CC and DSO SSs is 
not affected by a DoS attack. In this case, all the 
DSO SSs involved in the load shedding strategy 
will be correctly armed before applying the trip 
command, so that the EI will be stabilized with 
high probability.
Figure 2 describes instead the timed evolution 
of the EI and II models when an EI failure happens 
at time 0 and a DoS attack occurs on the com-
munication channel between the DSO CC and the 
DSO SSs. In this context, only a subset of the 
DSO SSs, which should be armed, will be cor-
rectly armed when the trip command is issued.
Indeed, in presence of a DoS of high severity 
(or of a DoS that has reached a high severity 
level), an arming request sent by the DSO CC to 
a DSO SS can be lost or delayed so heavily so as 
to arrive after the trip command has been received 
by the DSO SS. Obviously this has an impact on 
the success of the load shedding strategy; if the 
procedure is not successful another RS2 function 
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is immediately re-started to stabilize the EI. How-
ever, this introduces a delay in stabilizing the EI, 
which could lead to a cascading effect: new high 
voltage lines in the power grid could fail increas-
ing the EI severity status and/or giving rise to a 
large blackout.
Models Description
All the models developed have been described 
using the Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) 
formalism defined within the tool Möbius (Daly, 
Deavours, Doyle, Webster & Sanders, 2000). SAN 
is a formalism that extends the Stochastic Petri 
Net and it is meant for modelling the behaviour 
of discrete event dynamic systems, in particular in 
terms of their possible stochastic behaviour (proba-
bilistic choices and random delays associated to 
events). The system state is represented through 
the marking of SAN places: there are two types 
of places, standard places, that have an associated 
state expressed as a non-negative integer (called 
marking) and extended places, whose state is a 
variable of any type recognized as a legal type in 
the C language. A place graphically appears as a 
circle: blue circle for standard place and orange 
for extended one.
An activity (also called transition) may take 
place (fire) when its condition (defined on a sub-
set of the model places) is true. The effect of the 
firing of an activity is to modify in some way the 
marking of the places. In the SAN formalism, an 
activity can be immediate (graphically a bar) or 
timed (graphically a thin box): immediate fire in 
zero time while timed ones fire after a random/
deterministic delay has elapsed since its enabling.
Figure 1. Timed evolution of the EI and II upon a single EI failure without DoS attack
Figure 2. Timed evolution of EI and II upon a single EI failure in presence of DoS attack on the 
communication channel between the DSO CC and DSO SSs
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An activity of any kind is enabled by a par-
ticular condition on the marking of a set of places. 
For simple conditions involving only standard 
places this can be modelled by directly connect-
ing such places with the activity through properly 
oriented arcs.
Another way to express the enabling condition 
of a certain activity are the input gates. An input 
gate is connected to an activity and to a subset 
of standard or extended places; the input gate is 
characterized by two expressions: 1. a predicate, 
a Boolean condition expressed in terms of the 
marking of the places connected to the gate; if 
such condition holds, then the activity connected 
to the gate is enabled; 2. a function expressing the 
effect of the activity firing on the marking of the 
places connected to the gate.
Besides input gates, a SAN model can contain 
output gates. An output gate has to be connected 
to one activity and to a set of standard or extended 
places; and it specifies through a function the 
effect of the activity firing on the marking of the 
places connected to it.
Hence, the marking enabling a given activity 
can be expressed by means of oriented arcs, or 
by means of an input gate. Input and output gates 
graphically appear as left oriented red and right 
oriented black triangles, respectively.
In a SAN model, it is possible to set several 
firing cases for an activity; each case corresponds 
to a different effect of the firing and has a certain 
probability: when the activity fires, one of its cases 
is chosen at random. A case graphically appears as 
a small circle close to the activity; from the case 
an arc is directed to an output gate or to a set of 
standard places.
Finally a SAN model can be expressed using 
hierarchical modelling paradigm, so that it is pos-
sible to specify the behaviour of each individual 
component (atomic model), and then combine such 
components to create a model of the complete 
system through the Replicate and Join operators.
We shall now proceed to a general descrip-
tion of the models that compose the whole SAN 
model of the EPS, to then provide a more detailed 
description for the models that takes into account 
the specific scenario of a load shedding strategy 
and the behaviour of a communication channel 
subject to a DoS attack.
The EPS SAN Model
A modular and compositional approach is em-
ployed to model an electric power system. A 
number of atomic models have been developed 
to represent both EI and II logical components, 
as identified in the previous Section, and their 
interactions in presence of malfunctions affecting 
one or both infrastructures. Such atomic models, 
implemented through the Stochastic Activity 
Networks (SAN) formalism, have been already 
presented in previously published papers (e.g., 
(Chiaradonna, Lollini & Di Giandomenico, 2007) 
and (Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico & Lollini, 
2011)). Therefore, we shortly recall them in this 
chapter, but without details. They are the models 
representing:
• The generic power line with connected 
transformers;
• The generic protection mechanisms and 
breakers connected to the two extremities 
of the power line;
• The automatic evolution (autoevolution) of 
the electrical infrastructure when an event 
modifying its state occurs;
• The computation and application of the lo-
cal reconfiguration strategy RS1(), and the 
computation of the global reconfiguration 
action RS2();
• A node in the grid (generator, load or sub-
station) and the associated control and 
regulation mechanisms (TSO sentinel and 
DSO SS);
• The TSO CC system, where the regional 
reconfiguration strategy RS2() is applied, 
and the DSO communication network.
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While we basically maintained the above 
recalled models in the current EPS modelling 
framework, we extended the models related to the 
II infrastructure for what concerns the protocols 
addressed by the scenario to apply the emergency 
plan (arming requests) and the severity of the at-
tacks to the DSO net, in particular all the models 
associated to the last two sets of submodels listed 
above have been modified with respect to the one 
proposed in (Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico & 
Lollini, 2011), to appropriately take into account 
the reference scenario.
The newly developed models allow us to rep-
resent with higher accuracy the attacks processes, 
which have impact on the time to the application 
of the global reconfiguration function RS2(), re-
sulting in an improved accuracy of the measures 
assessed through the developed EPS modelling 
framework.
The Model Components 
Relevant for the Scenario
The II additional behaviour that takes into ac-
count the protocol associated to the load shedding 
scenario is modelled through four atomic models 
(TSO CC and DSO CC, communication channel, 
DSO SS and DoS attacker) shown as separate 
entities in Figure 4, while Figure 3 accounts for 
their interaction through common places.
The whole II model is obtained in two steps. 
First the DSO SS and network models are joined 
together through superposition on place Rec, which 
is then replicated as many times as the number of 
DSO SSs. Secondly the obtained model is joined 
with the models of TSO/DSO CC and of the DoS 
attacker through superposition on places Severi-
tyDos and Packet.
Before describing each component in detail, 
let us recall some graphical aspects of the SAN 
formalism used: standard places are depicted in 
blue (dark in black and white) like places arm 
and Buffer_Out in Figure 4, extended places are 
depicted in orange (light color in black and white), 
like place Packet in the same Figure, which is 
an extended place encoding a short vector with 
dimension equal to the total number of DOS SSs. 
All activities of Figure 4 are timed (blue bar), with 
an associated stochastic or deterministic delay. 
Input gates are depicted as red triangles (light 
colour in black and white), while output gates are 
black triangles. The predicate and the function 
implemented by the gate are an integral part of the 
model definition, although they are not shown on 
Figure 4 for the sake of readability. For example 
the predicate for the input gate isArm is: “marking 
of arm must be different from 0 and marking of 
Buffer_Out cannot be greater than the predefined 
buffer size”; while its function decreases by one 
the marking of place arm. An example of the use 
of cases is illustrated by the transition Sent of 
Figure 4: there are two firing cases that model the 
possibility of losing or not an arming command, 
depending on the DoS severity level (marking of 
the standard SeverityDoS place).
Figure 3. Composition scheme of the submodels in Figure 4
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The model in Figure 4a represents the arm-
ing process that involves the TSO CC and DSO 
CC. When the place arm is marked due to the 
detection of an EI fault (interaction with the II 
submodel), then the arming process is started: 
this is represented by activity TSOreqForArming, 
modelling the TSO CC choice of which DSO SSs 
will be involved in the arming process and their 
notification to the DSO CC.
After TSOreqForArming firing the DSO CC 
sends the arming commands (activity sendArming) 
to its DSO SSs, which have been selected by the 
TSO CC. These commands are sent to the cor-
responding DSO SSs through the communication 
channel modelled by the model in Figure4b. The 
extended place Packet contains all the arming 
commands, which are waiting for being transmitted 
from the DSO CC to the DSO SSs; each command 
contains the id of the destination DSO SS. These 
arming commands can be lost or delayed (activity 
Sent) depending on the DoS attack severity (place 
SeverityDoS). A received command is stored in 
the input buffer (place Rec) of the corresponding 
DSO SS model.
The model of the behaviour of a DSO SS is 
modelled in Figure 4c. When an arming command 
is received in place Rec, the DSO SS arming is 
executed; this is modelled by the firing of activ-
ity Exec, which changes the marking of place 
ArmedDSOSS. Observe that place AllArmedSS is 
used to count the number of DSO SSs correctly 
armed and it is shared among all the DSO SS 
submodel replicas. Activity Timeout models a 
time-out after which an armed DSO SS is disarmed.
The DoS attack model is shown in Figure 4d, 
where the marking of place SeverityDoS represents 
the different DoS severity levels (i.e. L0 is the 
lowest severity level,..., LMax is the highest sever-
ity level). Activities IncSeverity and DecSeverity 
are used to increase or decrease the DoS severity 
respectively. During the simulation, these two 
activities can be disabled thanks to two boolean 
parameters so that we can consider situations 
where the DoS severity can either decrease or 
increase or both.
Models Interaction
The existing EPS modelling framework and the 
additional models, created for taking into account 
the scenario of interest, interact through common 
places shared between the SAN models that are 
composed by using rep and join operators. Figure 
3 already describes the interaction between the 
components of the DoS SAN model. The com-
posed model interacts with two additional SAN 
Figure 4. SAN atomic models of the components involved in the load shedding process and of the DoS 
attack
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submodels that are part of the overall EPS model. 
They are called RS and RTS and represent respec-
tively the evaluation of RS2 and the application 
of the RS2 reconfiguration.
The extended place ArmedDSOSS is used 
by the RTS component to decide if an RS2 
configuration can be applied, if all the stations 
involved in the new reconfiguration are armed, 
or not, and if at least one station involved in the 
reconfiguration is not armed. In this latter case a 
new evaluation of the reconfiguration of RS2 and 
the arming requests of the corresponding stations 
involved in the reconfiguration could be needed. 
The information about the stations that are not 
armed (which cannot therefore be involved in the 
evaluation of an RS2 configuration) is obtained by 
the RS submodel through common places shared 
between the RTS and RS components. Place arm 
is set to 1 by the SAN RS to trigger a new request 
of arming. The output gate SendArming sets to 1 
all the items of the array Packet, corresponding 
to the stations to arm, based on the results of the 
linear programming problem solved in the RS 
submodel. This information is shared through an 
extended common place deltaP_RS2 (that is not 
shown in Figure 4).
CASE STUDY AND 
RESULTS DISCUSSION
The modelling framework developed in the 
previous Section has been exercised on a case 
study, to illustrate its features under interesting 
combinations of failures affecting the power grid 
infrastructures and attacks of different severity 
affecting the control infrastructure.
EI Grid
We used the IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996 
(RTS- 96), described in (IEEE RTS, 1996), as 
the reference power grid for our analysis. This 
power grid has been used in a number of power 
system reliability evaluation studies, including 
those already performed by the authors of this 
paper. The configuration we consider is shown 
in Figure 5. It is composed of 42 nodes (of which 
10 are generators and 17 are loads) and 56 lines. 
In the figure, label “Pi/Pmaxi” associated with the 
generators (circles) represents the initial (active) 
power Pi and the maximum power that the gen-
erator i can supply Pmaxi. Label “Di” associated 
with the loads (squares) represents the power 
demand (constant over time) of the load i. Label 
“Fij/Fmaxij” associated with the lines represents the 
initial power flow Fij through the line (i,j) and the 
maximum power flow Fmaxij that a transmission 
line can carry without incurring in overloading. A 
negative Fij value means that the current is flowing 
in the opposite direction of the corresponding ar-
row. Also, in brackets it is shown the susceptance 
of each line. Note that the values for Di and Pmaxi 
have been assigned so as to intensify the stress of 
power lines, which carry a power flow closer to the 
maximum possible before overloading, to analyse 
the impact of attacks in rather critical conditions 
from the electrical point of view.
II Model
In the II model we have considered a system com-
posed by a single TSO CC and DSO CC, and 27 
DSO SSs, resulting in a large SAN model with 
177 places (most of which are complex places) and 
almost one hundred activities. For what concerns 
the parameter estimation of the activity delays we 
have used information reported in the literature 
(e.g. for activity Timeout in Figure 4c) or estimated 
through specific experiments performed on the 
testbed presented in Chapter “Cyber Risks in 
Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures” of this book.
For the TSO CC and DSO CC model TSOreq-
ForArm is defined as a deterministic activity 
with deterministic delay equal to 8 minutes and 
SendArming fires with a random delay character-
ized by an Erlang probability distribution with 6 
phases, each with mean sojourn time 0.0025 sec 
(rate 400), resulting in an average delay of 0.015s.
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In the network model activity Sent fires with a 
random delay distributed according to an hyper-
exponential distribution that allows to account 
for the randomness of the communication time 
in presence of a DoS attack. It is characterized by 
a probability p and two rates λ1 and λ2 (selected 
with probability p and 1-p respectively); the three 
parameter values depend on the reached DoS 
severity level (i.e. L0,...L5) as shown in Table 1. 
For this activity the firing cases (deciding whether 
the packet is lost) are defined in terms of a Packet 
Loss Probability parameter, that also depends on 
the DoS severity level as reported in the same 
table (last column).
The parameter values characterizing activity 
Sent (delay and loss probability) can indeed be 
derived from the measures obtained through the 
experiments performed on the testbed as described 
in Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy Grid ICT 
Infrastructures” of this book. We provide some 
hint on a possible approach to estimate the pa-
rameters from measures similar to those illus-
trated in Figures 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter “Cyber 
Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures”. The 
loss probability can be derived by combining the 
information on frequency and duration of conges-
tion periods and the percentage of lost messages 
in normal conditions and under congestion. In 
Figure 5. Diagram of EI grid corresponding to the RTS96 test grid (generators are circles, loads are 
squares and substations are rhombi)
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order to correlate the packet loss probability with 
the DoS severity level it is necessary to repeat the 
experiments illustrated in Chapter “Cyber Risks 
in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures” several times 
under stable perturbation due to the traffic com-
ing from the DoS attack. The delay could be 
derived from the inter message time measure 
introduced in Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy 
Grid ICT Infrastructures”, and it should include 
the interaction between the retransmission of 
packets at the transport protocol level and the 
application level retransmission policy in case of 
missing acknowledge of control messages.
In the DSO SS model activity Exec fires with 
a random delay with average 0.2s characterized 
by an Erlang probability distribution with 4 
phases, each with delay 0.05s (i.e. with rate 20); 
Timeout is a deterministic activity with delay equal 
to 20 minutes.
Finally, activities IncSeverity and DecSever-
ity in the DoS attacker model fire with a random 
delay characterized by a negative exponential 
probability distribution with rate 0.001.
Again, the parameter of the activities that 
describe the evolution (increase/decrease rate) 
of the DoS severity should be built from the data 
measured on several experiments emulating the 
same type of DoS attack under the same initial con-
dition through the testbed, as explained in Chapter 
“Cyber Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures”. 
An histogram could be built showing the packet 
loss rate and average packet delay experienced in 
predefined intervals of time (taken since the start 
of the attack) while the DoS is actually increas-
ing or decreasing. In general, deriving model 
parameters from the measures is a delicate task 
that may require several iterations for achieving 
reasonable accuracy: the steps for each iteration 
are (1) measurement, (2) parameters estimation 
from measured values, (3) validation of the effect 
induced by the estimated parameters values on 
the model behaviour (i.e. consistency check of 
some model derived measure with corresponding 
testbed measures); the last step may lead to more 
detailed measure requirements or adjustment of 
the parameters estimation procedure, or even to a 
model update (since this fitting with the measured 
data mat require a change in the level of detail of 
the model description).
As we shall see in the simulation results sec-
tion, the measures may also be given as a range 
of realistic values for the model parameters: these 
may then be used to perform sensitivity analysis 
of the dependability measures of interest for a 
selected set of parameter values.
Measures of Interest
Since the EPS is modelled as a stochastic process, 
the electrical energy provided to the final users (ith 
load Pi) and the electrical energy required by the 
final users (ith demand Di) are random variables. 
Therefore, all the measures of interest we consider 
are the mean of random variables defined as a 
function of Pi and Di. During the experiment it 
is assumed that these parameters do not change. 
The main measure of interest we consider in this 
chapter to assess the impact of cyber attacks in 
situations where the EI is affected by malfunctions, 
is UDDoS, defined as the percentage of the power 
demand that, on average, is not met in the interval 
[0; t] (UD stands for “Unsatisfied Demand”, see 
definition in Table 2). UDDoS is a measure of the 
service interruption, defined as the mean of the 
load shed during the period [0; t] (i.e., the total 
Table 1. Transmission delay and packet loss 
probability associated with each DoS severity level 
DoS Severity P λ1 λ2
Packet Loss 
Probability
L0 0.01 2.000 10 0.000
L1 0.50 2.000 10 0.010
L2 0.70 0.100 2 0.035
L3 0.80 0.050 2 0.052
L4 0.85 0.016 2 0.062
L5 0.95 0.012 2 0.078
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unsatisfied load) divided by the total power de-
mand in the same period. It provides an indication 
of the system operator satisfaction. The measure 
is computed through a transient analysis of the 
SAN overall model (obtained by composing the 
models presented in the previous Section).
This measure has been evaluated for different 
line failure initial events, and different commu-
nication network performance (from the most 
critical case where no substation is reachable, to 
the most favourable case in which all commands 
are delivered to the selected substations in due 
time, passing through intermediate dynamic situ-
ations due to a DoS attack in either increasing or 
decreasing phase). A sensitivity analysis has also 
been performed, as function of the delay distribu-
tion parameters assigned to activity Sent.
Other measures of interest are those charac-
terizing the impact of an attack. In particular it 
can be of interest to estimate the expected value 
of the following two possible impact indicators 
defined in Chapter “Cyber Risks in Energy Grid 
ICT Infrastructures” of this book. The first one is
γ j
j
n m= /  
where nj is the number of DSO SSs not armed due 
to the DoS attack (for a given severity evolution 
scenario j) and m is the total number of DSO 
SSs addressable by the load shedding application 
(according to the RS2 strategy). The second one 
is instead:
γ i
i
P P= /  
where Pj is the amount of load still connected due 
to the DoS attack (for a given severity evolution 
scenario j) preventing the arming of ni DSO SSs; 
P is the total amount of Load to be disconnected 
(according to the RS2 strategy).
In the simulation experiments the measure 
corresponding to the impact indicator γ j is NADoS 
(see definition in Table 2).
Analysis of the Simulation Results
In the following, we discuss the results of the 
analyses performed. All the results have been 
obtained through simulations consisting either of 
Table 2. Performance indices, acronyms and 
definition 
Name Definition
Performance indices
UD
DoS E P
E
i i
DoS
i i
DoS
∆
Φ
∑
∑








NA
DoS E N
E A
DoS
DoS








∆P u
i
DoS ( )
0
∞∫ ( )− ( )( )D u P u duiDoS iDoS
Φ
i
DoS u( )
0
∞∫ ( )D u duiDoS
D u
i
DoS ( ) D ui ( ),  if, at time u, the DoS is active or its 
effects are not yet removed
0, otherwise
P u
i
DoS ( ) P ui ( ),  if, at time u, the DoS is active or its 
effects are not yet removed
0, otherwise
N
DoS
The total number of DSO SSs not armed due 
to the DoS attack, during the period the DoS is 
active or its effects are not yet removed
A
DoS
The total number of DSO SSs addressable by 
strategy to which the arming request has been 
sent, during the period the DoS is active or its 
effects are not yet removed
Acronyms
LCSU All LCS Unreachable
LCSR All LCS Reachable
TDDS Time Depending Decreasing Severity
TDIS Time Depending Increasing Severity
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Figure 6. UDDoS and NADoS as a function of the DoS behaviour for different failed power lines
Figure 7. UDDoS and NADoS for a subset of failed power lines varying the parameter kPacksentRate
Figure 8. UDDoS and NADoS for the failed power line (114-116) varying the parameters kPacksentRate and 
kPackLossProb
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40.000 batches, or of a number of batches adequate 
to reach a confidence level of 0.95.
Figure 6 shows the results of a first set of ex-
periments, aimed at investigating how the severity 
of the DoS affecting the II infrastructure impacts 
on both the measures UDDoS (percentage of unsup-
plied load) in Figure 6a, and NADoS (percentage 
of not armed substations), in Figure 6b, when 
individual power lines (as reported on the x-axis) 
fail. To improve readability, only a subset of the 
power lines are shown, selected among those that 
have a significant impact on UDDoS.
The measure UDDoS has been evaluated for all 
the DoS behaviours considered in our study, while 
for NADoS we limited the evaluation to increasing 
and decreasing severity behaviours (TDIS and 
TDDS) only, since the value of this measure is 
100% or 0 for the two extreme DoS behaviours 
LCSU and LCSR (no LCS reachable and all LCS 
reachable), respectively.
For both measures, the impact of the DoS 
depends upon the failed line (the EI component) 
and ranges from a few percent to 25%, depending 
on the severity of the DoS attack (the II compo-
nent). Focusing on UDDoS, it can be noted that, 
not surpringly, the highest impact is shown by the 
worst DoS behaviour, that is when all LCS are not 
reachable. However, for almost half of the shown 
power lines this impact is rather low (below 3%).
Moving to NADoS in Figure 6b, the effect of 
the decreasing severity behaviour of the DoS 
(TDDS) is significantly heavier than that of the 
opposite case of increasing severity (TDIS) on the 
percentage of not armed substations. Actually, for 
the TDIS behaviour, this percentage is rather low 
and remains almost constant for any of the failed 
power lines considered. In fact, the increasing 
DoS severity is better coped with, since the start-
ing level of severity is low and, according to the 
parameters setting we selected, the reconfiguration 
performed by RS2() is possible within the time 
of increase of the severity level.
Finally, note that there is no direct relationship 
between the trend of the two measures: the percent-
age of not armed substations is significantly high 
for failed power lines in the right part of Figure 
6b, while correspondingly the unsatisfied load 
is very low. Certainly, the linear programming 
problem at the basis of the reconfiguration solu-
tion computed by RS2() contributes to this effect, 
although further investigations would be desirable 
(and we are currently exploring other effects).
The TDDS DoS behaviour is the second most 
impacting after the extreme LCSU case, so it has 
been taken as the default DoS attack behaviour in 
our next set of analyses that concentrate on study-
ing the effects on UDDoS and NADoS on a subset of 
four power lines taken from those whose failure 
is particularly critical, as revealed by Figure 6a. 
Figure 7 shows the results of this analysis, again 
for both indicators under assessment, varying the 
rate at which the arming commands are transmit-
ted by activity Sent. This rate is different for each 
severity level of the DoS, and to vary it consistently 
we have used a multiplicative factor, represented 
by the parameter kPacksentRate on the x-axis. This 
parameter ranges from 10-3 to 102, so the packet 
sent rate varies in the analysis from 1/1000 to 
100 times the default values reported in Table 
1). The trend common to both measures is that, 
when the arming command is delayed with respect 
to the default value (portion of the figures at the 
left of kPacksentRate=1), worse results are obtained, 
while almost no improvement is observed for 
lower delay (portion of the figures at the right 
of kPacksentRate=1). Comparing it with Figure 6a, 
we observe that the arming delay resulting from 
kPacksentRate=0.001 leads to the worst load loss for 
the power lines considered.
To investigate more deeply into the system 
behaviour we have performed another analysis, 
whose results are shown in Figure 8. This analysis 
concentrates on the system behaviour upon the 
failure of the power line with the highest impact 
on both UDDoS and NADoS, that is line (114,116), 
for different values of the probability of losing 
an arming command, under the default TDDS 
DoS severity. Also this probability is different for 
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each severity level of the DoS, and, similarly to 
the previous analysis, to vary it consistently, we 
have used a factor represented by the parameter 
kPackLossProb on the x-axis (which ranges from 0.1 to 
100, but keeping the resulting probability value 
up to 1).
For both measures, it can be observed that, 
lowering the probability of losing an arming com-
mand with respect to the assumed default value 
does not bring benefits (kPackLossProb<1). Instead, a 
significant worsening is obtained when this prob-
ability increases. The most interesting result from 
this analysis is the combined effect of the two 
parameters kPackLossProb and kPackSentRate. Decreasing 
the delay in sending an arming command does 
not lead to relevant gain when the probability of 
losing the command is high (10 or 100 times the 
default value, in the figure). Instead, for values of 
kPackLossProb<=1, decreasing the delay in sending an 
arming command (moving from kPackSentRate=0.01) 
leads to significant improvements, until the best 
obtainable values for UDDoS (when kPackSentRate=1) 
and NADoS (when kPackSentRate=10), corresponding 
to LCSR case (Figure 6).
Finally, Figure 9 presents the results of UDDoS 
and NADoS, in presence of both TDDS and TDIS 
attack behaviours. It can be noted that worse val-
ues are shown in the case of TDDS, confirming 
the results of previous analyses. Interestingly, 
the highest difference between the curves in both 
Figures 9a and 9b occurs in correspondence of 
kPackSentRate=0.01. Then, increasing the value of 
this parameter implies that the delay in sending 
the arming command decreases, weakening the 
difference in impact by the two DoS cases towards 
having TDDS having the same effect as TDIS, 
until the best values are reached by both UDDoS 
and NADoS. Instead, decreasing the value kPackSentRate 
below 0.01 results in the opposite effect, and it is 
TDIS that resembles the effects of TDDS, raising 
the values of both UDDoS and NADoS until the worst 
values they can reach.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
AND CONCLUSION
The presented framework can be adapted to model 
other types of cyber attack. For instance the DoS 
attack may affect the communication channel 
between the TSO sentinel and the DSO SSs that 
may cause both a premature disarming due to the 
delay/loss of some test packet and the delay/loss 
of the trip command.
In details this would require to explicitly 
model the communication channel between the 
TSO sentinel and the DSO SSs, besides the one 
Figure 9. UDDoS and NADoS for the failed power line (114-116) for the two cases of increasing and de-
creasing severity
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between the DSO CC and the DSO SSs already 
included in the current model.
The same atomic model representing the 
communication network may be replicated to this 
purpose, however in the new scenario we should 
consider two types of messages modeling the test 
packet and the trip command. This can be avoided 
if the test packets are not explicitly modeled but 
their effect could be emulated by adding a (DoS 
severity level dependent) probability of shortening 
the disarming timeout. In the new scenario, the 
RS2 can fail when a set of armed DSO SSs have 
been disarmed due to the delay/loss of their test 
packets or when armed DSO SSs are excluded by 
the load shedding due to the delay/loss of their 
trip commands.
Intrusion attacks instead could be dealt with 
by embedding a new atomic model representing a 
possible set of attack scenarios with an incremental 
propagation of the intrusion attack towards the 
target node(s) of the II and possibly an incremental 
restoration of II nodes representing the successful 
application of an Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) protection strategy.
In this context, when target nodes are reached, 
a subset of DSO SSs becomes unreachable and 
cannot participate to the load shedding strategy.
This could be modeled exploiting the multi-
formalism facilities of Möbius so that the attack 
propagation schema as well as the IPS countermea-
sure behaviors could be represented by means of 
a Fault Tree or their extensions (Codetta, Iacono, 
Franceschinis & Vittorini, 2004).
It has been the goal of this chapter to show 
how a model based approach can provide a way 
to reason about the possible consequences of 
vulnerabilities present in one infrastructure on 
the other, in particular we have studied the case 
of how a cyber attack can worsen the service 
provided by an Electrical Grid. An abstract but 
sufficiently precise description of both the electri-
cal infrastructure operation and of the ICT control 
system procedures together with their interaction 
schemas allow to point out the influence that a 
failure in one subsystem may have on the other, 
with particular attention to the cascading or es-
calating effects.
This paper has concentrated on a quantification 
of the impact of a cyber attack in terms of two 
quantities. A more “customer oriented” measure 
(the percentage of undelivered load) and one which 
can be seen as more “grid management oriented” 
(the percentage of substations that are not able to 
participate in the load shedding activities due to 
a cyber attack).
A relevant issue for quantification is the choice 
of the parameters characterizing the times, the 
failure probabilities, and in general all the relevant 
quantitative characteristics influencing the final 
results: this opens many interesting considerations 
on the possible interactions with experimental 
settings: from the exchange of parameters, to the 
model validation, to the selection of the most 
interesting sets of experiments.
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